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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, after his parents’ divorce, one-year-old Joshua DeShaney went to
live with his father, Randy DeShaney.1 Just three years later, a local hospital
admitted Joshua with multiple abrasions and bruises.2 After doctors reported
child abuse suspicions, the Winnebago County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) conducted a brief investigation but closed it shortly
afterward.3 Joshua was again admitted to a local hospital with questionable
abrasions and bruises a month later.4 Yet again, DSS opened an investigation
and quickly closed it.5
Over the next six months, a DSS caseworker reported numerous
suspicious injuries on Joshua’s head.6 DSS took no action other than
recording the incidents.7 Unfortunately, in March of 1984, Randy
DeShaney, Joshua’s father, beat him into a life-threatening coma.8 Due to
severe brain hemorrhaging, Joshua lived with permanent brain damage until
he died in 2015, and his father was incarcerated for only two years for child
abuse.9 However, DSS and its social workers escaped civil and criminal

1. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191
(1989) (noting that Joshua’s father remarried shortly after gaining custody, but his second
marriage also ended in divorce).
2. See id. at 192 (stating that Mr. DeShaney’s second wife complained to the police
that Joshua’s father “hit the boy causing marks”).
3. See id. (explaining that DSS interviewed Joshua’s father, who denied all abuse
allegations and signed a voluntary agreement where he promised to cooperate with DSSoutlined reunification goals).
4. See id. at 193 (clarifying that the emergency room notified the caseworker that
Joshua was in the hospital again).
5. See id. at 192 (detailing that the caseworker concluded there was no basis for
child abuse).
6. See id. (articulating that the caseworker conducted several home visits over the
six-month period).
7. See id. at 192-93 (stating the caseworker meticulously documented the abuse but
never initiated removal proceedings).
8. E.g., id. at 193 (detailing Joshua’s surgery revealed extensive brain damage and
several traumatic head injuries inflicted over years).
9. E.g., id. (stating that Joshua’s father was subsequently convicted of child abuse);
Bob Collins, The Sad End of ‘Poor Joshua’, MPR (Nov. 12, 2015, 9:39 AM),
https://blogs.mprnews.org/newscut/2015/11/the-sad-end-of-poor-joshua/ (reporting that
Joshua’s father’s sentence was influenced by testimony that Joshua fell down the stairs).
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liability.10
In 2005, eight-year-old Gabriel Fernandez moved in with his mother, Pearl
Fernandez, and her boyfriend, Isauro Aguirre, after being shuffled between
his relatives’ homes.11 Pearl allegedly took Gabriel in to obtain welfare
benefits.12 However, after moving in with his mother, Gabriel’s well-being
took a drastic downturn.13
Over the next eight months, Pearl and Isauro habitually abused Gabriel.14
Investigators found that they: fed him cat litter, locked him in a small
cupboard for many hours with a sock in his mouth, knocked out his teeth,
shot him in the face with a BB gun, and pepper-sprayed him.15 Multiple
people reported the potential child abuse to the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (“CFS”) and the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department.16 CFS records repeatedly indicated that
Gabriel was at a high risk of being abused, but his caseworkers continuously
closed his case.17
On May 22, 2013, Pearl and Isauro beat Gabriel so severely that he was

10. E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S at 203 (holding that under current law, state officials
acting in their capacity are not held liable for failure to act and noting that Wisconsin
citizens are free to create such a system through legislation).
11. See generally Mahita Gajanan, The Heartbreaking Story Behind Netflix’s
Documentary Series ‘The Trials of Gabriel Fernandez’, TIME (Mar. 3, 2020, 2:19 PM),
https://time.com/5790549/gabriel-fernandez-netflix-documentary/ (noting that when
Gabriel first lived with his gay uncles, he was healthy and happy, but after Pearl
transferred custody, as she was afraid Gabriel would become gay, his health declined).
12. See id. (reporting that Pearl’s family thought she was neglectful despite her
taking in Gabriel).
13. See id. (expressing that Pearl had been physically abused, suffered from mental
health issues, and physically abused her other children).
14. See Beatrice Verhoeven, ‘Trials of Gabriel Fernandez’: 9 Most Shocking Details
About the Murder at Heart of Netflix Documentary, THE WRAP (April 9, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.thewrap.com/trials-of-gabriel-fernandez-most-shocking-details-netflixdocumentary/ (voicing they were homophobic and called him “gay” while abusing him).
15. E.g., id. (explaining that Gabriel often wrote suicide notes saying that “he just
wants to be a good boy. . . ”).
16. See id. (reporting that law enforcement had been called to Gabriel’s residence
multiple times for reports of child abuse); Jennifer Nied, What Happened to Gabriel
Fernandez’s Social Workers Who Were Charged in His Murder, WOMEN’S HEALTH
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.womenshealthmag.com/life/a31741999/gabriel-fernandez
-social-workers/ (highlighting that Gabriel’s first-grade teacher regularly called
Gabriel’s caseworker to report child abuse).
17. See id. (indicating that Gabriel’s caseworkers falsified public records).
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declared brain-dead after admission to the hospital.18 The next day, Gabriel
died.19 The attending physician found Gabriel had a fractured skull, a broken
nose, missing upper teeth, bite and burn marks, a BB bullet in his lung, and
old and new rib fractures.20 The judge sentenced Pearl to life in prison and
Isauro to death for the murder and torture of Gabriel.21 However, like in
Joshua’s case, though nearly thirty years apart, CFS and Gabriel’s social
workers escaped civil and criminal liability.22
This Comment argues that absolute civil state immunity for child
protection agency workers violates all children’s due process rights and
children of color’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.23 Part II describes the evolution of the
child welfare system and children’s rights in America.24 Part III argues that
DeShaney’s holding created a conflict among the circuits regarding social
worker accountability in child maltreatment cases.25 Part III also argues that
DeShaney has disproportionately impacted children of color, thus creating
disparate treatment, violating the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Part IV
18. E.g., Gajanan, supra note 11 (reporting that the responding paramedic said
Gabriel’s case was the worst she had ever seen).
19. See generally Doctor Describes Injuries to Gabriel Fernandez’s Body, Testifies
He was Determined Brain Dead, ABC-7 L.A. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://abc7.com/palmdale
-boy-child-abuse-gabriel-fernandez-torture-isauro-aguirre/2572619/ (explaining that
two separate exams, conducted twelve hours apart, found zero brain function).
20. E.g., id. (quoting the Deputy, who stayed with Gabriel, said “she saw bruises all
over his body, bumps, cuts, his eyes were swollen shut and . . . small items were lodged
under his skin.”).
21. E.g., Marisa Gerber, ‘Nothing Short of Evil’: Judge Sentences Mother to Life in
Prison and Her Boyfriend to Death in Gabriel Fernandez Murder Case, L.A. TIMES
(June 7, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-gabriel-fern
andez-sentencing-20180607-story.html (recounting that the judge said the abuse was
“horrendous, inhumane, and nothing short of evil.”).
22. See Nied, supra note 16 (reporting that the appellate court dismissed the criminal
case because there was no probable cause to hold the state agency liable).
23. See generally, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (establishing that US citizens cannot be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law or denied equal
protection of its laws).
24. See infra Part II (discussing the rise in governmental child protection agencies,
the overrepresentation of children of color in the child welfare system, and the
development of children’s rights).
25. E.g., infra Part III (arguing DeShaney created an accountability vacuum for child
protection agency workers, regardless of their egregious disregard in child maltreatment
cases).
26. See infra Part III (arguing children of color are disproportionately harmed by
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recommends increasing resources, staffing, and cultural humility training for
child protection agency workers to reduce the overrepresentation of minority
children in the child welfare system.27 Finally, Part V concludes by
reiterating the Court should overturn DeShaney.28
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Child Welfare System
1.

The Advent of an Overburdened Child Welfare State

Before 1974, the federal government played a valuable but minor role in
child protection.29 In 1974, Congress took on a leadership role in passing the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (“CAPTA”).30
However, the expansion of the child protection system, particularly the rapid
passage of laws requiring various professionals to report suspected child
abuse and neglect mandatorily, unleashed a flood of cases that overwhelmed
the child protection system.31 By the 1980s, the system was struggling to
stay afloat.32
Currently, child protection agency workers are overburdened and
underfunded because the system is constantly brimming with cases.33 The
jobs of child protection agency workers require them to wear multiple hats,
social workers’ racial bias and DeShaney’s holding that children do not have due process
rights).
27. See infra Part IV (suggesting remedies beyond the legal system to rectify the
racial gaps in the child welfare system).
28. See infra Part V (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment should protect
children’s due process rights from private actors).
29. See generally John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America,
42 FAM. L. Q. 449, 454 (2008) (detailing the historical shift from private to governmental
child protection agencies).
30. E.g., id. at 457 (noting the expansion of the nation’s child welfare system so that
every state had services available).
31. Cf. Stephen M. Krason, CHILD ABUSE, FAMILY RIGHTS, AND THE CHILD
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM 19 (7th ed. 2013) (delineating that between 1972 and 1984, child
abuse reports rose from 610,000 to 1.5 million).
32. See id. at 47 (acknowledging that in 30 to 55% of fatal cases from approximately
1975 to 2000, child protection agencies had been aware of child abuse or neglect).
33. See generally, Alyssa Sterkel, Underpaid and Overworked: The Life of a Social
Worker, THE CURRENT (Mar. 21, 2011), https://nsucurrent.nova.edu/2011/03/
21/underpaid-and-overworked-the-life-of-a-social-worker/ (arguing that tremendous
student debt and low remuneration makes social work an undesirable field).
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operating as therapists, health specialists, and adoption professionals
simultaneously.34 Furthermore, high caseloads and paperwork, but low
clerical support, overburdens social workers.35 Despite the complexity of
their jobs, social workers only receive an average national annual salary of
about $43,000 per year.36 These factors have led to high turnover rates
among caseworkers and have impaired states’ ability to protect maltreated
children in their communities adequately.37
2. The Overrepresentation of Children of Color in the Child Welfare
System
As of 2016, there were approximately 435,000 abused and/or neglected
children in the child welfare system.38 Historically, children of color are
overrepresented in the child welfare system, particularly Black and Native
American (“Native”) children.39 Before the passage of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”) in 1978, there was a systematic practice of removing
Native children from their homes and communities.40 Between 25 to 35%
of all Native children, before the ICWA, had been removed from their

34. See id. (reporting that the Florida Department of Children and Families is open
every hour of every day, oversees 18,000 foster children, and receives about 1,000 abuse
hotline tips daily).
35. E.g., id. (citing an audit report, which suggested increasing salaries and clerical
support to alleviate burdens on social workers).
36. E.g., Social Work Education at a Glance, COUNCIL ON SOC. WORK EDUC.,
https://www.cswe.org/Students/Prepare-for-Your-Career/Social-Work-At-A-Glance
(last visited Oct. 28, 2021) (reiterating that social workers must have a master’s degree,
a license, and continuous education to maintain that license).
37. See Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Employment and the Child Welfare System 2
(2010), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.naswtx.org/resource/resmgr/imported/Child_Wel
fare_and_Social_Workers_White_Paper.pdf (reporting that turnover rates nationwide
are between 30 and 40% annually).
38. See Child. Bureau, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2016: REPORT TO CONGRESS 4
(2019), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/cwo2016.pdf#page=
15 (reporting that the overall national child victim rate was 9.1 child victims per 1,000
children).
39. See generally Susan Chibnall et al., Children of Color in the Child Welfare
System: Perspectives from the Child Welfare Community, 3 (2003), https://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/children.pdf (correlating the overrepresentation of minority
children in the foster care system to poverty).
40. See About ICWA, Nat’l INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, https://www.nicwa.
org/about-icwa/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2021) (arguing the systemic practice deeply
impacted Native families and tribes).
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familial homes.41 Furthermore, while Black children account for only 15%
of all children in the United States, they account for 25% of substantiated
maltreatment victims.42 Conversely, white children encompass 79% of the
U.S. child population but 51% of substantiated child victims.43 Of every
1,000 white children in the United States, 5.2 are in foster care, compared
with 9.9 of every 1,000 Black children and 16.9 of every 1,000 Native
children.44
Scholars argue the disproportionate representation of minority children in
the child welfare system is due to racial bias.45 A series of decisions at
different points along the child welfare continuum determine a child’s
trajectory: reporting, investigation and substantiation, family preservation
and reunification, and foster care.46 At “any number of points along” the
child welfare continuum, research has found that children of color may be
predominantly impacted by racial bias in child protection decisions.47
B. The Evolution of Children’s Rights in America
1.

DeShaney: Do Children Have Due Process Rights?

In the 1980s, Joshua DeShaney, through his mother, brought a civil case
under 42 USC Section 1983 against the Winnebago County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) and some of its social workers.48 The Supreme
41. See id. (reporting that 85% of removed Native children were placed outside of
their communities, even when fit kin were available).
42. E.g., Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 3 (detailing that Black children are
represented in the foster system at a rate of 1.66 times their proportion of the overall
population).
43. See id. (finding that white children were more likely to receive support to stay at
home, whereas Black children were predominantly recommended for foster care
placement).
44. E.g., Child. Def. Fund, THE STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2021 28 (2021),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/The-State-of-AmericasChildren-2021.pdf (reporting that a child is put into foster care every two minutes).
45. E.g., Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 4 (arguing there is an overreporting of
maltreatment of racial minority children and an underreporting of maltreatment of white
children).
46. E.g., id. (showing families of color are more likely to be investigated for child
abuse and neglect than white families, despite similar substantiation rates across races).
47. See id. at 3, 6 (finding that minority families receive less support to stay unified
compared to their white counterparts).
48. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193
(1989) (arguing DSS and its social workers deprived Joshua of his liberty without due
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Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a positive duty
on the state to protect children’s due process rights of life, liberty, and
property from private entities.49 The Court narrowly interpreted the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as only a limitation on the
state’s power to act and not as a guarantee of minimal levels of safety and
security.50 To justify its narrow reading of the Due Process Clause, the Court
reasoned that Joshua’s father harmed Joshua, not the state of Wisconsin.51
Even though Wisconsin had temporary custody of Joshua and returned him
to his father, the Court held Wisconsin had not placed Joshua in a worse
position than had it not acted at all.52 Thus, the Court described Wisconsin’s
actions, at best, as “inaction.”53
The Court’s formalistic emphasis on positive versus negative rights
foreshadowed its conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment only protected
against affirmative government action.54 In his dissent, Justice Brennan
argued that the majority’s characterization of Wisconsin’s behavior was
inaccurate because Wisconsin took affirmative action in Joshua’s case.55
Through legislation, Wisconsin created and empowered DSS to help
children like Joshua.56 Although other governmental agencies and private
parties were primarily responsible for reporting potential child abuse,
Wisconsin’s law channeled all reports to DSS and absolved mandatory

process of the law by failing to intervene and protect him from his father’s abuse, which
they knew or should have known about).
49. E.g., id. at 195 (emphasizing the Court could not be moved solely by “natural
sympathy”).
50. See id. (asserting the Due Process Clause generally does not give an affirmative
right to governmental aid, even when it could protect rights the government itself could
not inhibit).
51. E.g., id. at 201 (reasoning that while Wisconsin may have been aware of the
dangers that Joshua faced, it did nothing affirmatively to render Joshua more vulnerable
to those dangers).
52. See id. (contending the state is not the permanent guarantor of an individual’s
safety because it sheltered him once).
53. E.g., id. at 203 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating DSS “stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.”).
54. See id. at 204 (implying the majority’s narrow focus on positive versus negative
rights was a “quibble over dicta” with severe ramifications).
55. E.g., id. at 204-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that Wisconsin gave DSS
significant discretionary control over whether to protect children from suspected abuse).
56. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3) (1987-1988) (enabling statute giving DSS
discretionary control in child abuse cases).
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reporters from liability once they reported.57
Ultimately, DSS decided to remove Joshua from his home.58 DSS
exercised that control by removing Joshua from his father’s custody after
Joshua’s initial hospital visit.59 When DSS ignores or dismisses child abuse
suspicions, like how it ignored numerous questionable bruises and abrasions
on Joshua’s body, abused and neglected children are left to fend for
themselves.60 Wisconsin actively intervened in Joshua’s life through DSS
and knew that Joshua was in danger.61 The Court’s previous rulings suggest
that it could find a state complicit in an injury if it cuts off private sources of
aid and then refuses aid itself, even if it did not directly create the harm.62
Despite DeShaney’s holding, child protection agencies continue to serve
and protect child abuse and neglect victims in communities around the
nation.63 DeShaney created a vacuum of accountability and justice. As a
result, maltreated children can suffer serious, sometimes even fatal,
consequences because of their social workers’ deliberate indifference.64

57. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204 (contending that Wisconsin relieved private
actors and other government agencies from any obligation to do more than report
suspicions of child abuse to DSS).
58. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3)(c)(2) (1987-1988) (enabling statute giving DSS
social workers the power to remove children from their home if DSS determines that it
is in their best interest in terms of physical health and safety).
59. E.g., id. at 209 (noting that DSS convened an ad hoc “Child Protection Team” to
consider whether to permanently remove Joshua from his father’s custody after his first
hospital visit).
60. Cf. Christian M. Connell et al., Maltreatment Following Reunification:
Predictors of Subsequent Child Protective Services Contact after Children Return Home,
33 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 218, 226 (2009) (reporting that within three years of
reunification, 30% of children experience substantiated maltreatment again).
61. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
governmental oppression can result when a state monopolizes a vital duty, just to ignore
that duty later).
62. See generally, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961)
(holding a restaurant liable for discriminatory conduct since its business was intertwined
financially with the city).
63. See generally, Myers, supra note 29, at 454 (detailing the rapid expansion of
governmental child welfare agencies post-CAPTA).
64. Compare Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978) (upholding qualified
immunity for federal agency officers), with Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)
(barring judges from liability within their judicial jurisdiction), and Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (agreeing that members of
Congress hold absolute immunity in intra-legislative statements and activities).
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Further, courts have struggled to fill the void DeShaney created.65 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have failed to craft a uniform standard to hold
social workers accountable for professional misconduct in child abuse and
neglect cases.66
In Duchesne v. Sugarman, the Second Circuit held that social workers
enjoy only qualified immunity when removing children without court
proceedings and acknowledging a parent’s demands for a hearing.67
Conversely, in Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Services, the
Ninth Circuit held that social workers who suspected child abuse had
absolute immunity for seeking, obtaining, and executing a court order to
seize a child.68 In another similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that social
workers had absolute immunity in initiating child maltreatment
investigations.69 Finally, the Sixth Circuit ruled that, when initiating
proceedings, social workers have absolute immunity but, when investigating
abuse or conducting administrative functions, they do not.70
Additionally, social workers’ professional misconduct particularly
impacts children of color’s life outcomes within the child welfare system due
to racial bias.71 The DeShaney decision exacerbated systemic racial
65. E.g., Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir.
1987) (explaining that denying absolute quasi-judicial immunity for executing court
orders would jeopardize judicial immunity recognized by the Supreme Court); Meyers
v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987)
(comparing the origins of prosecutorial immunity in removal proceedings and judicial
immunity); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1977) (defining
qualified immunity not as good faith actions but by the bounds of the sphere of official
responsibility).
66. See Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157 (citing prior Ninth Circuit cases to demonstrate the
Court’s consistent stance that quasi-judicial actors receive absolute immunity).
67. E.g., 566 F.2d at 827, 833 (emphasizing that the most fundamental social
institution in American society is the family).
68. E.g., 834 F.2d at 765 (reasoning that quasi-judicial functions need absolute
immunity to maintain the integrity of the judiciary).
69. See Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157 (comparing child protection agency workers to
prosecutors in exercising discretion to initiate proceedings for child maltreatment).
70. Compare Salyer, 874 F.2d at 378 (finding that social workers have absolute
immunity to start investigations), with Achterhof, 886 F.2d at 829-30 (concluding social
workers have only qualified immunity during child abuse investigations), and Kurzawa,
732 F.2d at 1458 (finding social workers have similar absolute immunity as witnesses
and other persons in judicial processes).
71. E.g., Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 6 (concluding that the overrepresentation
of minority children in the child welfare system suggests that racial bias is affecting
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inequality within child welfare services and thus, created an equal protection
issue for children of color under the Fourteenth Amendment.72
2.

An Overview: Equal Protection Rights for Children of Color

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was created to
combat racial discrimination.73 Historically, the Supreme Court has used its
equal protection jurisprudence to protect communities of color.74 For
example, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginian
law that prevented interracial marriage.75 The Court applied strict scrutiny
and found the law did not have a legitimate purpose separate from racial
discrimination.76 Thus, the Virginia law violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court
held that the rigid racial quotas used by the University of California medical
school violated the Equal Protection Clause.77 However, the Supreme Court
upheld affirmative action by allowing race to be one of several factors to be
considered during college admission procedures.78 Furthermore, in Brown
v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court expanded its equal protection
jurisprudence to Black children, holding that “separate but equal”
decision-making).
72. See infra Part III (recognizing that by not ensuring children’s due process rights
in DeShaney, the Court’s decision amplified existing racial disparities in the child
welfare system).
73. E.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Theodore M. Shaw, The Equal Protection Clause,
THE CONST. CTR. (last visited Oct. 28, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/amendment-xiv/clauses/702
(explaining
that
racial
discrimination was still persistent after the Fourteenth Amendment was passed).
74. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978)
(upholding affirmative action programs in admissions policies as constitutional), with
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (concluding marriage rights require equal
protection under the law), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (ruling
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal) [hereinafter “Brown I”].
75. E.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (finding marriage is a fundamental right requiring
equal protection under the law).
76. See id. at 11 (stating that equal application of a discriminatory law across races
is unconstitutional).
77. E.g., Regents, 438 U.S. at 320 (upholding affirmative action because it is
necessary to promote a substantial state interest).
78. E.g., id. at 313 (stating that “the nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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educational facilities for racial minorities were inherently unequal, violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 Thus, in using
its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Court combatted the remnant
effects of slavery to protect racial minority communities.80
III. ANALYSIS
Despite the Court’s holding in DeShaney, child protection agencies
continue to serve and protect abused and neglected children around the
nation.81 However, in the years following DeShaney, two significant
consequences have emerged, detrimentally impacting the nation’s child
welfare system and the children in it.82 First, DeShaney failed to provide a
legal standard to hold child protection agency workers accountable in child
abuse and neglect cases.83 Second, DeShaney failed to provide children of
color equal protection under the law in the child welfare system.84
A. DeShaney Failed to Provide a Standard to Hold Child Protection
Agency Workers Accountable in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases
The United States Supreme Court has previously decided cases involving
state actors’ immunity in the legislative, executive, and judicial systems.85
79. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95, n. 11 (1954) (finding that the racial segregation
of public education instilled a sense of inferiority and detrimentally affected Black
children); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (enabling local
judiciaries to enforce Brown I) [hereinafter “Brown II”].
80. See Regents, 438 U.S. at 320 (finding that affirmative action is not
unconstitutionally discriminatory).
81. See generally Childs. Bureau, Trends in Foster Care & Adoption: FY 2010-2019,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb
/report/trends-foster-care-adoption-fy-2010-2019 (reporting that between 2014 and
2019, the proportion of removed children exiting the foster care system through adoption
rose from 21.5% to 26.5%).
82. See infra Part III (discussing that DeShaney created an accountability vacuum
for social workers and exacerbated racial inequality in the child welfare system).
83. E.g., infra Part III section A (insisting that qualified immunity for social workers
is necessary to protect maltreated children).
84. See infra Part III section B (declaring that because children do not have
substantive due process rights, children of color do not have equal protection under the
law).
85. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 498, 517 (1978) (concluding that federal
employees are entitled to qualified immunity); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967) (insisting that judges cannot be civilly liable for decisions); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (holding members of Congress have absolute
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However, it has failed to provide lower courts with a standard that defines to
what extent social workers are immune from civil liability resulting from
their misconduct in child protection cases.86 Thus, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagree on the level of immunity for social worker misconduct
in child protection cases.87
In Duchesne, the Second Circuit held that a mother could sue four child
protection agency workers for depriving her of her due process rights when
they removed her two children without court proceedings and refused to
acknowledge the mother’s demand for a hearing.88 The court emphasized
that the most fundamental social institution in American society is the family
and that the child protection agency workers deprived the mother and
children of their rights to live together because of their forced separation.89
It stressed that the Civil Rights Act Section 1983 provided a cause of action
to any person who suffered a constitutional deprivation by a state actor.90
Conversely, in Coverdell, the Ninth Circuit held that a social worker who
suspected a child’s mother of sexual abuse had absolute immunity when
seeking, obtaining, and executing a court order to seize the newborn baby
from her mother’s care.91 The Ninth Circuit held that the social worker was
entitled to absolute immunity because she was performing a quasiprosecutorial role in seeking and obtaining the court order, and she was

immunity).
86. See Rinderer v. Del. Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 703 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (stating that the majority view is that social workers do not enjoy absolute
immunity); but see Jenkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 212 Cal. App. 3d 278, 286 (1989)
(clarifying that social workers tend to enjoy absolute immunity in federal cases).
87. Compare Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 833 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining
that a social worker’s sincere belief that they were doing right did not provide them with
qualified immunity), with Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 759
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a social worker enjoyed quasi-judicial absolute immunity
for executing a court order).
88. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 824 (stating the family had been separated more than
two years before the social worker-initiated court proceedings for the children).
89. E.g., id. at 824, 833 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974)) (“freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
90. See id. at 829 (noting that social workers are state actors as provided by the Civil
Rights Act § 1983).
91. See Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 759, 765 (finding the mother and her husband were
emotionally unstable, easily angered, and violent).
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performing a quasi-judicial role when executing the court order.92
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that a social worker had absolute
immunity for investigating a child’s parent after abuse complaints arose.93
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that social workers needed absolute immunity to
execute their duties successfully.94 The court added that the risk of
retaliation could severely affect social workers because discretionary
decision-making, in high stakes but uncertain situations, is integral to the
job.95 The court reasoned that absolute immunity is justified because social
workers need protection to make the necessary and quick decisions that are
crucial to a child’s safety.96
In a rare combination of both approaches, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that, when initiating proceedings, social workers have
absolute immunity but, when investigating abuse, they do not.97 Like the
Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that child protection agency
workers are responsible for prosecuting child abuse and neglect cases, and
they must be able to do their jobs without fear of harassment or
intimidation.98 However, the Sixth Circuit qualified its position by ruling
that social workers do not enjoy absolute immunity in all aspects of their
92. E.g., id. at 762 (explaining the parallel between social workers bringing
dependency proceedings and prosecutors bringing criminal charges because both
positions exercise independent judgment about when to bring such proceedings).
93. Cf. Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th
Cir. 1987) (comparing social workers to prosecutors when they exercise discretion in
prosecuting child maltreatment).
94. E.g., Whelehan v. Cnty. of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-1099 (W.D.N.Y.
1984) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 498, 516 (1978)) (stating that not giving social
workers or prosecutors immunity would be detrimental to society and the judiciary).
95. See Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 765 (predicting that without absolute immunity, social
workers will not intervene when a child could be in danger because of fear of retaliation).
96. See, e.g., Mazor v. Shelton, 637 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (arguing that
social workers’ attention would shift from protecting abused and neglected children
toward protecting themselves from retaliatory litigation).
97. See Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Meyers, 812 F.2d
1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987)) (explaining that immunity rests not on status or title, but on
the function performed and that prosecutorial functions receive absolute immunity); see
also Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (1989) (finding social workers have only
qualified immunity during child abuse investigations); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d
1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding social workers have absolute immunity in
initiating proceedings).
98. See Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458 (granting social workers absolute immunity in
starting removal proceedings); see also Salyer, 874 F.2d at 378 (holding that social
workers have prosecutorial absolute immunity to start removal proceedings).
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job.99 Instead, the court held that administrative or investigatory functions
of social work are only entitled to qualified immunity.100
Despite the apparent split among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court has
refused to hear cases regarding social workers’ civil immunity.101 Although
the rationale behind absolute social worker immunity102 is easy to follow, a
social worker’s deliberate indifference can result in a fatality or a serious
child injury.103 The Second Circuit’s qualified immunity approach, whereby
courts can hold social workers civilly liable for due process violations, is the
most consistent with the United States Constitution and 42 USC Section
1983.104
Qualified immunity for child protection agency workers protects
children’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.105 As the Second
Circuit noted, the most fundamental right is privacy in family matters, and
the right should be free from unnecessary governmental interference.106 The
Second Circuit also acknowledged that this right was reciprocal for both
parents and children.107 Thus, when the government takes affirmative steps
99. See Achterhof, 886 F.2d at 830 (explaining state law required child protection
agencies to maintain a central registry regarding child maltreatment cases, so qualified
immunity was necessary to enforce the law).
100. See id. (noting that state law did not relieve child protection agencies from
investigating child abuse reports even during removal proceedings, so absolute immunity
would be inappropriate).
101. E.g., Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir.
1987) (granting quasi-judicial absolute immunity); see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566
F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding qualified immunity).
102. See Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th
Cir. 1987) (arguing that social workers will not intervene when a child is in danger in
fear of retaliation).
103. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that child protection agencies are often the
last hope of escape for abused and neglected children).
104. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 833 (holding that social workers enjoy only qualified
immunity, even if acting with good faith).
105. See id. at 828-30 (noting that the social worker’s failure to properly conduct
removal proceedings was a violation of due process rights, and qualified immunity was
necessary to rectify that deprivation via 42 USC § 1983).
106. E.g., id. at 824 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))
(reaffirming the right to privacy in family life as integral to America’s history and
tradition).
107. See id. at 826 (explaining that children’s right to privacy regarding family
protects them from unnecessary dislocation from the emotional intimacy of daily
association with parents).
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that impact a removed child’s right to privacy in family matters, the
Fourteenth Amendment demands due process in the form of investigation,
substantiation, and removal proceedings.108
State statutes charge child protection agency workers, as state actors, with
conducting due process functions, such as investigation, substantiation, and
removal proceedings.109 When they act with deliberate indifference, it
directly impacts children’s right to privacy in the family realm.110 Thus,
qualified immunity is also consistent with 42 USC Section 1983 because it
would allow mistreated children, through an adult, to file actions against
state social workers for depriving them of their due process rights.111
Additionally, qualified immunity does not interfere with the rationale
behind absolute immunity.112 Qualified immunity does not guarantee guilt
against social workers in every suit.113 Judges would retain the power to
dismiss frivolous claims, and they could create a standard of offering social
workers maximum leeway except in extremely reckless cases.114 Qualified
immunity would simply allow cases deserving judicial intervention a chance
to get in front of a judge or jury.115
B. DeShaney Failed to Provide Abused and Neglected Children of Color
Equal Protection Under the Law
An equal protection issue arises because child welfare agencies’ policies
108. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state can
be liable when it ignores a vital duty that it monopolized); see also Duchesne, 566 F.2d
at 826 (clarifying that while emergency removal of endangered children is constitutional,
further detention without notice and an opportunity to be heard is unconstitutional).
109. See WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3) (1987-1988) (enabling statute giving social workers
discretionary control in child abuse cases).
110. E.g., Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 831 (explaining that 42 USC § 1983 does not require
direct action causing harm to impose liability, but simply that state actors promoted an
affirmative policy which allowed the type of action that caused the harm to happen).
111. See 42 USC § 1983 (empowering U.S. citizens to sue state actors for deprivations
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution).
112. Cf. Mazor v. Shelton, 637 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (arguing that social
workers would drown in retaliatory litigation and be distracted from protecting
maltreated children).
113. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 831 (stating plaintiffs have the burden of proving that
the defendant’s acts caused the constitutional deprivation).
114. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (empowering judges to dismiss cases for failure of
the complaint to state a claim on which relief can be granted).
115. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 833 (reasoning that juries could evaluate good faith
defenses, among others, in § 1983 claims).
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and their social workers’ actions negatively discriminate against children of
color.116 However, children of color seeking justice have been severely
impaired by the Court’s holding in DeShaney which states they do not have
a substantive due process right to be protected from deprivations of their life,
liberty, and property from private actors—since equal protection claims are
generally dependent on there being a substantive due process right.117 If the
Court were to overturn DeShaney, children of color could bring equal
protection claims under 42 USC Section 1983 and argue that child welfare
enabling statutes have a discriminatory impact on them based on race.118
Historically, the Court has used a strict scrutiny analysis when analyzing
racially discriminatory laws.119
The Court in Brown I held that racial discrimination in the public
education sphere was unconstitutional.120 It also held that all federal, state,
and local laws, permitting such discrimination were unconstitutional.121 Like
the school boards in Brown I and Brown II, which had the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving problems in school
systems, child welfare agencies are solely responsible for investigating,
substantiating, and beginning removal proceedings for maltreated
children.122
116. See Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 3 (arguing that racial bias impacts minority
children’s outcomes negatively at each point along the child welfare system’s decisionmaking continuum).
117. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (concluding marriage
requires equal protection), with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding
free speech has equal protection).
118. See 42 USC § 1983 (empowering U.S. citizens to sue states for deprivations of
their rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution).
119. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 264, 320 (1978)
(applying strict scrutiny when analyzing rigid quota schemes designed to improve
diversity), with Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (using strict scrutiny when analyzing laws
prohibiting and punishing interracial marriage), and Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (employing
strict scrutiny when analyzing “separate but equal” educational systems).
120. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “separate but
equal” educational facilities are inherently unequal and violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
121. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (establishing
that courts may oversee and resolve discriminatory problems related to administration,
arising from the physical condition of schools, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and more).
122. See id. (recognizing that local bodies are best equipped to handle local
populations and problems); see also Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (explaining that one of the
most important functions of local governments is providing public education).
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Since there were legitimate reports that racially segregated schools were
equalized, the Court in Brown I looked beyond individualized tangible
factors.123 Instead, the Court observed the discriminatory effect systemic
segregation had on public education as a whole.124 Similarly, child welfare
enabling statutes may be facially neutral and may not appear to discriminate
racially, but the systemic practices of child welfare agencies are
discriminatory at all points along the child welfare continuum.125
Additionally, the Brown I Court highlighted that education is one of the most
essential functions of state and local government, although education is not
a constitutionally recognized positive right.126 Similarly, although the
DeShaney Court held that there is no positive right for children to be
protected from harm from private citizens, child welfare agencies are
arguably one of the most important actors in state and local governments
today.127
Brown I’s glaring similarities suggest that children of color could
successfully file an equal protection claim under Section 1983 regarding
child welfare policies even without a substantive due process right.128
However, if the Supreme Court overturns DeShaney, children of color will
have a substantive due process right to base their claims on and bolster their
argument.129 The Court would likely see that the discriminatory policies in
the child welfare system, which negatively impact children of color, are

123. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492 (explaining that racially segregated schools
equalized regarding facilities, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other tangible
factors).
124. See id. at 494 (arguing segregation instilled a sense of inferiority that affected
the motivation of Black children to learn and negatively impacted their development).
125. E.g., Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 3 (arguing that racial bias impacts social
workers’ decision-making and their ability to protect minority children).
126. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (articulating that compulsory school attendance
laws and the continuous significant expenditures for education demonstrated the nation’s
recognition of the importance of education to society).
127. See Sterkel, supra note 33 (reporting the Florida Department of Children and
Families oversees 18,000 foster children and receives about 1,000 abuse hotline tips
daily).
128. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (reasoning that a service that the state has
undertaken to provide is a right which must be made available to all citizens on equal
terms).
129. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (protecting the substantive due
process right to marry and stating that it automatically affords equal protection under the
law).
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similar to those in public school segregation policies.130 Just as social
science studies substantiated the harmful effects racial segregation had on
Black children’s well-being and development that influenced the Brown I
Court, the Supreme Court could look to the abundant research demonstrating
the overrepresentation of children of color in the child welfare system is due
to racial bias and creates poor life outcomes.131
On the other hand, an equal protection claim against child welfare agency
statutes could present difficulties because child welfare enabling laws are
facially neutral.132 Unlike the statute in Loving, which prohibited interracial
marriage and was on its face discriminatory, child welfare enabling statutes
are facially neutral and do not bring up distinctions based on race.133
Similarly, unlike in Regents, where a state medical school’s unique
admissions program employed strict racial quotas, child welfare enabling
statutes do not delineate any service based on race.134 As a result, counsel
for children of color could likely argue that child welfare agencies’ systemic
practices have a discriminatory impact on children of color and deprive them
of equal protection under the law.135 However, the Supreme Court may be
reluctant to embrace the proposition that a law without a discriminatory
purpose is unconstitutional even if it has a discriminatory impact.136
The Supreme Court has previously been hesitant to accept this theory of
liability in fear that it would suspect any difference in treatment amongst
racial groups, regardless of whether the differential treatment lacks racial
motivation and could otherwise have a rational purpose.137 Nevertheless, the
130. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (stating segregationist policies stunted the
educational and mental development of Black children).
131. E.g., id. at n. 11 (citing psychological studies showing racial segregation inhibits
Black children’s growth).
132. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (analyzing an anti-miscegenation law that criminally
charged and punished interracial marriage).
133. See id. (arguing that equal application of a statute containing racial classifications
is not enough to protect it from the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause).
134. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 264, 320 (1978) (striking
down a special admissions program under which positions in the class were reserved for
minority students).
135. See 42 USC § 1983 (1996) (empowering U.S. citizens to sue state actors for
deprivations of their civil rights).
136. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (quoting
“[D]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”).
137. See id. at 240 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)) (arguing
that a basic equal protection principle is that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
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Court has left some room open for facially neutral claims by stating that it
may infer an invidious discriminatory purpose from the totality of the
relevant facts.138
Another potential avenue for equal protection claims against child
protection agency statutes exists under 42 USC Section 1983.139 Children of
color could base their Section 1983 claims on their substantive due process
right to privacy in familial matters.140 As the Second Circuit noted in
Duchesne, privacy in familial matters is one of the most fundamental rights
in American society.141 Children of color would argue that the right to
privacy in family matters demands due process in the form of investigation,
substantiation, and removal proceedings.142 Furthermore, children of color
could argue that child protection agencies’ racially discriminatory policies
and practices, which disproportionately and negatively impact them at each
due process stage, deprive them of equal protection of their due process right
to privacy in familial matters.143 The Court would likely find that children
of color’s right to privacy in familial issues are afforded equal protection
under the law.144
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Children hold a vulnerable place in society because they cannot control
the environment they grow up in or the behavior of the adults around them.145
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racial discriminatory purpose).
138. See id. at 242 (including the fact, if it is true, that the law is more consequential
on one racial group than another).
139. See 42 USC § 1983 (1996) (enabling U.S. citizens to sue the government and
state actors for civil rights violations).
140. E.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that
children’s right to privacy in family matters means not being unnecessarily dislocated
from the emotional attachments derived from the intimacy of daily association with
parents).
141. See id. at 824 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (noting
that removing children from their homes without substantiation and due process threatens
the most essential and basic aspect of the right to familial privacy).
142. See id. at 826 (qualifying that while emergency removal of endangered children
is constitutional, further detention without due process is unconstitutional).
143. See 42 USC § 1983 (1996) (enabling citizens to sue the government and state
actors for deprivations of civil rights).
144. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the right to marry is
afforded equal protection).
145. E.g., Children in Vulnerable Situations, CHILD RTS. INT’L. NETWORK,
https://archive.crin.org/en/home/rights/themes/children-vulnerable-situations.html (last
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Although there are compelling reasons behind absolute immunity for social
workers, the Supreme Court should resolve the split among the circuits and
hold that social workers are only entitled to qualified immunity.146 If the
Supreme Court is unwilling to resolve the issue, state legislatures should pass
laws outlining that child protection agency workers only have qualified civil
immunity for misconduct in child maltreatment cases.
Absolute immunity is contrary to notions of accountability and justice.147
DeShaney departed from international consensus that governments have a
positive obligation to protect children from harm from private actors.148
Additionally, DeShaney’s holding contradicts rationales foundational to the
United States’ civil court system: it was built upon the belief that people
deserve redress for injuries caused by negligent or reckless behavior.149
When social workers display deliberate indifference, abused and neglected
children suffer the most.150 Most, if not all, states place the sole
responsibility of removing abused and neglected children from their homes
in state child welfare agencies.151
Proponents of absolute immunity often tout the overburdened and
underfunded life of child protection agency workers to justify removing
accountability mechanisms.152 However, the solution is not to create a
visited Oct. 6, 2021) (insisting children need special protections because they are more
vulnerable to violations of their rights than adults).
146. See Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987)
(declaring that social workers need absolute immunity, or they will not be willing to
intervene when a child could be in danger in fear of retaliation).
147. See Project on Immunity and Accountability, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/issues/project-on-immunity-and-accountability/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2021)
(voicing that state actor immunity makes the Constitution an empty promise).
148. See, 1577 U.N.T.S 3; 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989) (ratifying 194 countries to the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child except Somalia, South Sudan, and
the United States, and it was passed the same year DeShaney was decided).
149. See The Purpose of the Civil Law System, CHRISTIAN & CHRISTIAN,
https://www.cclawfirm.com/blog/2018/october/the-purpose-of-the-civil-justice-system
(Oct. 29, 2018) (stating that civil lawsuits have been declining for decades, despite
perception that the system is overrun with frivolous lawsuits).
150. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 210
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that maltreated children are entirely dependent
on child welfare agencies to save them from harm).
151. See id. at 210 (explaining that states’ mandatory reporting laws absolve other
actors from doing more than reporting potential abuse to child welfare agencies).
152. See generally A Day in the Life of a CPS Social Worker: It’s a Mess, THE DOE
(SEPT.
2020),
https://www.thedoe.com/narratives/day-in-life-cps-social-worker
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vacuum of justice, whereby abused and neglected children suffer the most.
Instead, the better solution is to increase salaries, staffing, clerical support,
and lower caseloads for social workers.153 These changes would ensure that
social workers can provide individualized and thorough support to each
child.154 Lastly, social workers need racial bias and cultural humility training
to address racial disparities in the child welfare system.155 Research
demonstrates that at each point along the decision-making continuum, racial
bias negatively impacts the outcomes of children of color, particularly Black
and Native children, in the child welfare system.156 Thus, child protection
agencies should adopt anti-bias policies and continuously conduct anti-bias
training.157
V. CONCLUSION
DeShaney had a cataclysmic impact on the nation’s child welfare system:
it set off a series of litigation, led to clashes between circuits on how to hold
social worker misconduct accountable, and left the nation’s maltreated
children even more vulnerable.158 Despite its detrimental effect on the child
welfare system, the Supreme Court has continuously denied certiorari to
(suggesting the toxic work environment encourages social workers to cut corners).
153. See Gary Bailey et al., Members Describe Their Experiences in Child Welfare,
NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS 1, 18 (June 2004), https://www.socialworkers
.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Mr2sd4diMUA%3D&portalid=0 (recommending less
paperwork, more funding, and more staffing).
154. E.g., id. at 15 (recommending caseloads between twelve-fifteen children per
worker as opposed to the current average of between twenty-four-thirty-one).
155. See Childs. Bureau, Child Welfare Workforce Development and Workplace
Enhancement Institute: Knowledge Development and Application Meeting Report,
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/wfinstitute/key/ (recommending accountability measures to ensure culturally competent
services are provided).
156. E.g., Chibnall et al., supra note 39, at 3 (arguing that the overrepresentation of
minority children in the child welfare system is because of racial bias).
157. See Dinah Schuster, Honing Cultural Humility Skills Can Improve Health Care
as a Whole, PENN MED. (May 13, 2021), https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/newsblog/2021/may/honing-cultural-humility-skills-can-improve-health-care-as-a-whole
(noting that the use of cultural humility trainings in the medical field, another field
responsible for the health and well-being of others, has a direct positive impact on
readmissions, pain management, surgical, and general health outcomes).
158. Compare Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding
that a social worker’s good faith alone did not afford them qualified immunity), with
Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
social workers have absolute immunity for executing a court order).
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resolve the time bomb it created.159 While the Court has avoided resolving
DeShaney, vulnerable young children, like Joshua and Gabriel, continue to
fall victim to an overburdened and underfunded child welfare state.160
Thus, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and overturn DeShaney,
holding that children have a substantive due process right to be protected
from harm.161 In doing so, not only would the Supreme Court resolve the
circuit split and uplift children’s rights, but it would also guarantee equal
protection under the law for children of color.162

159. See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1061 (1994) (cert. denied) (affirming
absolute immunity for initiating child dependency proceedings).
160. See generally Kate Giammarise, Report: Child Welfare Caseworkers
Overworked, Underpaid — putting Kids at Risk, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2017/09/14/child-abuse-PennsylvaniaHuman-Services-CYS-caseworkers-audit-Eugene-DePasquale/stories/201709140136
(noting that social workers often are overburdened with high caseloads and paperwork,
which negatively impacts their ability to protect children).
161. See supra Part III (insisting that the Court should overturn its decision in
DeShaney because children in the child welfare system have been negatively impacted
by DeShaney’s ruling).
162. See infra Part III (articulating that social workers create an equal protection issue
when they make racially discriminatory decisions).
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